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Japanese labor market institutions have been given substantial credit for
Japan’s enviable growth performance after World War II. The personnel
management system—with its strong job protection, enterprise-based
unionism, and intensive on-the-job training—is especially seen as a factor
that allowed Japan to utilize imported technology so rapidly and success-
fully. High levels of training, along with group-oriented activities, have also
been linked to the high quality of the Japanese goods that reached export
markets in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, many Japanese workplace prac-
tices, such as quality-control circles, have been adopted to good eﬀect in
the United States and Europe. On the macroeconomic side, the coordi-
nated but decentralized bargaining system is seen as providing for the wage
ﬂexibility that allowed Japan to adjust to supply shocks, such as the two oil
crises, more rapidly than most other Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation & Development (OECD) economies. Finally, the egalitarian nature
of the compensation system has been credited with providing the wide-
spread prosperity that underlies domestic demand.
The prolonged slowdown of the 1990s has led many to question whether
the institutions that were appropriate for the past are as wholesome for the
health of the contemporary and future economy. In particular, the rise in
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cent has changed views about the macroeconomic role played by the labor
market.
This disillusionment can be quickly summarized. Strong job protection
makes it diﬃcult for companies to eﬀectively restructure their activities in
response to the changing external environment. This means companies are
less likely to improve their balance sheets. A poorly developed external
labor market impedes movement of experienced and knowledgeable em-
ployees to companies where they might be more valuable. The government,
lacking conﬁdence in the external labor market’s ability to absorb the un-
employed, may have been reluctant to push for a more drastic resolution of
the bad debt problem that hampers the ﬁnancial system. Under conditions
of weak demand, the coordinated bargaining system makes it diﬃcult for
employees to increase their incomes and thereby may reduce domestic de-
mand. Wage restraint is contributing to the deﬂation that currently is mak-
ing diﬃculties for the eﬀective use of monetary policy to revive economic
growth. The aging of the work force makes it diﬃcult to maintain a system
where rewards are delayed and provided through promotion.
In this chapter, we address impediments to growth of the labor supply
that are aﬀecting the economy. Broadly speaking these are barriers to in-
terﬁrm mobility for career employees, especially older men, and the diﬃ-
culty women face in developing meaningful careers after taking time oﬀ to
raise children. The latter depresses the labor force participation of women,
especially the middle aged who have high educational attainment. Both of
these issues are closely tied to the Japanese personnel management system
and the legal framework that supports it.
A third impediment to growth on the labor supply side is the reluctance
to accept large numbers of immigrants into Japan. The outlook is that
Japan will continue with its existing policies in the short- to medium-run,
and we do not consider the issue. We also do not address the way in which
the unemployment beneﬁt system may induce individuals to remain un-
employed or how retirement beneﬁts may encourage earlier retirement.
With respect to the unemployment rate and participation rate of those over
sixty, Japan is doing as well, if not better, at using potential labor resources
than other OECD countries. It should be noted that the institutional fea-
tures of the economy that we view as impediments would be signiﬁcantly
less problematic if the economy was growing at the rates seen through the
1980s. If growth could be restored to 1980s’ levels through a surge in con-
sumer and investment demand, much of the estimated losses to labor input
might well be eliminated. However, that is unlikely to happen.
In the next section we provide an outline of the state of Japanese labor in
2001, focusing on the extent to which institutions long seen as characteris-
tic of the Japanese labor market have stayed the same or have been chang-
ing. Next, labor law and its consequences are discussed. We then look at
impediments to the mobility of career employees (primarily men) that may
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lower than levels seen in the United States are then examined. A quantita-
tive perspective of the barriers is presented, including their overall impli-
cations for economic growth, the role of government policy in removing
barriers is taken up, and we outline some areas in need of further research.
8.1 The Employment System
Although Japanese labor markets and institutions have been aﬀected by
the slump in growth that began in the 1990s, many of the main features re-
main largely intact. Widely noted aspects of the “Japanese model,” such as
enterprise-based unionism, low interﬁrm mobility, low unemployment,
compensation within gender groups that is highly determined by age and
seniority, large gender gaps in pay and promotions, and widespread use of
mandatory retirement systems, have not dissolved in the face of the slow-
down, despite press reports.
Evidence that the system has seen only minor change includes the fol-
lowing seven points:
1. Unions remain enterprise based, although union density has fallen
steadily from around 35 percent at the time of the ﬁrst oil shock (1973) to
21 percent in 2000.
2. Job tenure for full-time regular employees remains high (Chuma
1997) and may even be increasing for some age groups.
3. Interﬁrm mobility rates remain virtually unchanged (Rebick 2001),
although the number of employees forced to move because of bankruptcies
has risen since the Asian economic crisis of 1998.
4. The 5.4 percent unemployment rate in May 2002, although high by
Japanese standards, remains lower than the OECD average of 6.9 percent
(OECD standardized rates).
5. Although performance- and results-related pay are becoming more
important components of compensation arrangements, there is still a close
relationship between age (and, to a lesser extent, seniority) and pay. Japan-
ese age-wage proﬁles are steep mainly because blue-collar workers, as well
as white-collar workers, see large increases in pay with age and seniority.
With the exception of the managerial class of employees, the variance of
pay within age groups remains stable (Genda and Rebick 2000). All of this
is testimony to the continuing presence of enterprise unions and the inﬂu-
ence of large, unionized ﬁrms on wage-setting practices outside the organ-
ized sector.
6. The gender pay gap has narrowed for full-time employees (especially
the young), but the gap in hourly pay between female part-time workers
and male full-time employees remains large. Because some 40 percent of
women work part-time, the overall gender gap remains large. Among eight
OECD countries including Korea, only in Japan is gender—rather than
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(Tachibanaki 1998).
7. Japan has relatively few women in senior management or director po-
sitions compared with the United States or United Kingdom.
In spite of these observations, the Japanese model is evolving. Further-
more, most of the changes appear to be permanent, rather than temporary
accommodations to economic conditions or the need for restructuring.
1. The proportion of individuals who are part-time or contract workers
is increasing. In particular the percentage of employees working part-time
has been rising steadily since the 1960s, reaching as high as 39 percent of
women and 13 percent of men in 1999 (OECD 2001). The number of tem-
porary agency workers remains low at about 1 percent of the work force,
but has been increasing rapidly with liberalization of the laws regulating
agency work.
2. There has been a decline in the family-based enterprise sector. Some
women who would have been family workers and men who would have be-
come self-employed after mandatory retirement are now in the part-time
employee labor force. Although some of this trend may be due to small
businesses suﬀering during the 1990s, much of it is due to other aspects of
the fundamental restructuring of the economy that is taking place.
3. Managerial compensation is becoming much more sensitive to vari-
ous measures of performance. This is shown not only by surveys across
companies, but also by the fact that the variance of pay of middle-aged men
with higher education degrees has been increasing since the mid-1980s
(Genda and Rebick 2000).
4. Attitudes are changing, especially among young people. Although
the rates of separation for young workers have not increased much, most
young employees say that they expect to change jobs before mandatory re-
tirement. Young workers are quitting jobs at an increasing rate despite the
poor state of the economy. In 1999, 32 percent of university graduates and
47 percent of high school graduates quit their ﬁrst jobs within three years,
both rates increasing since 1996 (Ministry of Labor [MOL] 2000a).
5. There is an increasing level of part-time work among the young. Of-
ten referred to as “freeters,” they may be ﬁnding it diﬃcult to ﬁnd desirable
full-time jobs in the current economic climate (Genda 2001). On the other
hand, because of greater aﬄuence, they may feel less pressured into taking
jobs they don’t really want.
8.2 Worker Protection
The most obvious problem facing companies burdened with redundant
workers is the diﬃculty in shedding workers. There is long-standing agree-
ment between management and labor in Japan that allows management to
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companies) in return for a guarantee of employment until mandatory re-
tirement age (Gordon 1985, 1998). Since the late 1970s this has been al-
tered somewhat: Employees might be sent to other companies prior to
mandatory retirement provided that the guarantee of employment still
holds. In most cases, the original company ensures there are no ﬁnancial
losses to those transferred, making supplemental payments to workers if
necessary. Although this is seen as a commitment by management to labor,
which might be upheld in order to maintain the reputation of the employer
(and industrial peace), it is reinforced by Japanese case law. (The remain-
der of this section relies heavily on Chuma 1998.)
Japanese labor law does not, by statute, provide guarantees of continued
employment to employees, except that employers must give thirty days no-
tice of dismissals. The Japanese constitution, however, enshrines the indi-
vidual’s right to work (Article 27) and the right to a minimum standard of
“wholesome and cultured living” (Article 25). On this basis, Japanese
courts have interpreted the law to impose four main standards on employ-
ers wishing to dismiss workers. The employer must show that:
1. It is under severe duress, such as facing possible bankruptcy, and ex-
isting redundancies are unavoidable.
2. It has made eﬀorts to avoid redundancies by taking measures such as
cutting overtime, hiring freezes, transfers, seconding workers to other com-
panies, or seeking voluntary retirements.
3. It has consulted with its labor unions and employees.
4. It has a rational procedure for selecting those to be dismissed.
This case law developed in the 1950s in reaction to the widespread dis-
missals that followed implementation of the disinﬂationary Dodge Line of
1949–50 and the numerous industrial disputes that followed. The courts
were concerned about dismissals being used as a way of undermining labor
union strength, and the four conditions were aimed primarily at establish-
ing what constituted unfair labor practice under postwar labor laws. The
courts also established that redress for violation of these principles is not
only compensation paid to the ﬁred worker, but also reinstatement with
back pay. Again, this was to act as a deterrent to labor practices deemed
unfair.
The rulings had an eﬀect: In 1975, at the peak of post-oil shock dis-
missals, the proportion of separations that were “at the employer’s will”
stood at only 10 percent, compared to 21 percent in 1954, and through the
late 1970s ﬁrms in general took every action to avoid dismissals (Chuma
1998). The case law was further strengthened through rulings in the late
1970s, at a time when a number of court cases examined dismissals for the
purpose of labor adjustment during the downturn of the mid-1970s. In the
1970s and afterward, protection of workers from dismissals was extended
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after their contract expired and even to workers in the ﬁrst, probationary
year of employment.
Until 1998, the Labor Standards Law limited ﬁxed-term contracts to one
year or less. This was intended to force employers to oﬀer indeﬁnite-period
contracts to employees. After the 1998 revision, the law allows contracts of
up to three years, but only in the case where the employee is either over
sixty, in a specialized occupation, or under other restricted circumstances
determined by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW). Fur-
thermore, such a contract is renewable for only one year (Yamakawa 1998).
This is a considerable restriction and has been heavily criticized (Ohtake
2001, Yashiro 1999). Since 1999, there have been a number of court rulings
that have relaxed and, in at least one case, even dispensed with the frame-
work of the four conditions, but it is still too early to know what overall
eﬀect these rulings will have (Yamakawa and Araki 2001).
8.2.1 Consequences
One problem with the level of job protection provided by dismissal case
law has been the reluctance of employers to hire employees that they are
not sure they wish to keep indeﬁnitely. There also are negative externalities
(Yashiro 1999). We later deal with one of the more serious of these: the lack
of a well-developed external labor market and the information problems
that result.
Another eﬀect of current law is that it encourages companies to seek
government help in the form of subsidies, protection from competition,
and protection from creditors. Although labor case law was not respon-
sible for this action, it is part of a general approach that provides economic
security through employers rather than directly from the state or private in-
surance provision (Noguchi 1995). This may come at the expense of growth
in total factor productivity (TFP). For example, Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) note that TFP growth was exceptionally low at 0.8 percent per an-
num during 1978 to 1983, when the government took action to subsidize
and otherwise support industries that were in need of restructuring and
ﬁrms endeavored to avoid dismissals.
Although arguments can be made for worker protection from the view-
point of economic eﬃciency, there is little rationale for imposing a penalty
whereby workers must be reinstated with back pay. Chuma (1998) argues
that it would be better to simply impose a cash penalty that employers
should pay workers who have been dismissed in violation of the conditions.
He also suggests that courts may not be in the best position to evaluate the
ﬁnancial concerns of the company and that if the “severe duress” condition
is imposed too stringently it may compromise the survival of the ﬁrm over
the long run.
If a ﬁrm can no longer produce competitively, its human capital may
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eﬁts of worker protection may be quickly outweighed by the costs when
there is a widespread drop in the value of some kinds of ﬁrm-speciﬁc hu-
man capital.
8.3 Barriers to Mobility Between Firms
There are many barriers to mobility in the Japanese labor market. Table
8.1 gives us some indication of the problems from the point of view of em-
ployees, based on a survey by Recruit, an employment service, in which in-
dividuals who wanted to change jobs were asked why they found it diﬃcult
to do so. Of course, there also are corresponding issues on the employer
side of the labor market. We analyze all of these beginning with informa-
tion problems, skill mismatch, and lack of pension portability. Seniority
pay and age-based discrimination are then taken up, followed by diﬀeren-
tials in pay by ﬁrm size and egalitarian pay norms. Job protection, the re-
sult of both law and ﬁrms’ employment practices, is analyzed as a cause of
both excess workers within ﬁrms and skill mismatch.
8.3.1 Information Problems
A long-standing problem in the Japanese labor market concerns the lack
of available employment information. Commonly, workers do not know
exactly (in terms of quality or quantity) what skills they have, and employ-
ers are unclear about the skills they need. That is, there has been a sym-
metric lack of information, and this is almost certainly due to the poor de-
velopment of the external labor market in an economy with overall low
mobility. “Better information for job seekers” has been a recurrent slogan
in a situation where job postings tend to be ambiguous and crucial infor-
mation, such as job description and required skills, is lacking (Japan Insti-
tute of Labor [JIL] 1998).
Employment information can be categorized into extensive informa-
tion, which consists of information available to all job-seekers, such as ﬁrm
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Table 8.1 Reasons Changing Jobs is Diﬃcult: The Worker View
Percentage
Reason Giving Reason
I exceed the age limit of the job postings 40.8
My work experience is not transferable to the general society 23.4
Returns to seniority will be lost and I will suﬀer wage loss 21.8
I do not know how to look for jobs 19.1
I will lose personal contacts established through my work 14.1
I will suﬀer a loss in my pension 13.5
Source: Recruit Works Institute (2001b).size and wages, and intensive information, which is more likely to be of an
inside nature, such as work norms and work atmosphere of the employer
(Rees 1966). Access to intensive information is a beneﬁt insofar as it im-
proves the quality of the job match and subsequently leads to higher re-
wards and better job satisfaction (Granovetter 1974). Watanabe (1992) ex-
plains that workers are more likely to obtain intensive information through
acquaintances or former employers. According to Recruit’s (2001b) sur-
vey, 41 percent of job seekers gathered employment information through
contacts with friends, family, and former employers, and 72 percent of
those (30 percent of all those who found jobs) found jobs through this
channel.1
A labor market that favors informal job-search methods disadvantages
job seekers who are not endowed with network ties or otherwise must seek
re-employment through formal means. Workers seeking employment by
means of application through employment agencies experience consider-
able hardship. This includes longer duration of job search and a poor qual-
ity of match (JIL 1998). This is not a problem peculiar to Japan.
In a society where a market for job changers is only just evolving and
one-ﬁfth of workers surveyed said that they do not know how to look for
jobs, it is not surprising that ﬁrms specializing in headhunting and re-
employment services are growing rapidly. Human resource ﬁrms are fo-
cusing on the information mismatch between buyers and sellers of labor.
Their services include helping employers grasp which skills are needed and
helping job seekers identify what types of skills they have and the options
available to them. The government is gradually deregulating the market for
private employment services, including temporary employment agencies,
through revision of the Dispatched Employees Law. All this may lead to
improvement.
Access to privileged information from social networks may not be lim-
ited to employment information. The quantity and quality of social re-
sources are determined not only by an individual’s network of acquain-
tances, but also by virtue of belonging to a particular organization.
Establishing important connections with business partners and gaining
trust and reputation within the ﬁrm are important social resources that
workers acquire through their jobs. However, in most cases, such resources
are lost if a worker relocates to a diﬀerent establishment. Social resources
acquired through business can be a beneﬁt that facilitates workers’ upward
mobility within ﬁrms, but it can also be an impediment to interﬁrm mobil-
ity as workers fear that they will lose the personal contacts established
through work.
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1. In Granovetter’s 1974 study of male white-collar workers in Boston, 56 percent used con-
tacts.8.3.2 Skill Mismatch
Skill mismatch is a problem related to information availability, and it is
of increasing concern in Japan. A survey of OECD economies reports that
the Beveridge curve (which graphs unemployment rates against vacancies)
has been shifting outward in Japan since the 1970s (Nickell et al. 2001) and
has clearly accelerated in the late 1990s (Genda and Rebick 2000). This im-
plies more jobs are available for any given unemployment rate, and that
suggests there may be an increasing mismatch of skills. A survey of busi-
nesses and job seekers found that the level of vacancies (690,000) and ap-
plicants (740,000) across sixty occupational categories were fairly close,
but within categories the ratio of vacancies to applicants ranged from 9.95
to 0.05 (METI-Recruit 2001).
A lack of necessary qualiﬁcations of job applicants, especially in some
of the more specialized occupations, such as information technology (IT)-
related work, also is highlighted in the METI-Recruit study. It is clear that
information ﬂows must be improved in several ways: Firms need to convey
to training providers just what skills are needed, and that information must
also reach those who seek training or need it as a result of being laid-oﬀ.
Outplacement departments could do a better job in regard to the latter.
Public funds for retraining are oﬀered to both companies and individuals,
and there are proposals to increase the level of funding.
8.3.3 Lack of Pension Portability
Closely related to the problem of seniority-based pay (taken up later) is
the lack of portability of private, ﬁrm-based pensions. Japan implemented
a policy equivalent to the U.S. 401(k) deﬁned-contribution plan in October
2001. Prior to this, there were no tax advantages to saving outside of the
deﬁned-beneﬁt plans oﬀered by ﬁrms.
Firm-based pensions take a number of diﬀerent forms and can make
lump-sum payments or provide annuities after retirement, but they share
the characteristic of oﬀering beneﬁts based on years of service and ﬁnal
base salary. A recipient with thirty-ﬁve years tenure typically gets two to
four years of base pay (that is, not including semi-annual bonuses), with the
higher rates going to the better-educated employees of large ﬁrms (MOL
2000b). Portability problems arise because payouts often are reduced more
than proportionately if an employee leaves before mandatory retirement.
At the same time, an individual with low tenure at mandatory retirement
(due to switching ﬁrms) may suﬀer a more than proportional reduction in
beneﬁts. In other words, the likely losses in earnings from a move extend to
losses in pensions.
Ichinose (2001) uses pension tables to compute the pension losses that
would be experienced by individuals who leave a large ﬁrm (more than
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common pattern. The losses are computed assuming that an individual is
paid the average for the ﬁrm size and according to tenure. Pension losses
can amount to ¥10 million to ¥20 million from an average pension of ¥35
million, depending on age at separation. The younger the age, the greater
the loss. For this reason, ﬁrms, especially large ﬁrms, oﬀer additional
lump-sum payments to individuals who leave under early retirement plans.
The additional payments—typically between ¥5 million and ¥10 million—
cover some, but not all of the losses in pension value. In comparison to the
overall losses of up to ¥100 million that may be realized by workers who
lose their jobs at large ﬁrms at age forty, these are not large quantities but,
as suggested by the responses in table 6.1, have some inﬂuence on be-
havior.
8.4 Seniority and Pay Structure
There are signiﬁcant tenure eﬀects on earnings from seniority in the
Japanese workplace. The work of Koike (1988), Hashimoto and Raisian
(1985), and Mincer and Higuchi (1988) drew attention to the importance
of on-the-job training and the development of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
for Japanese men. Along with the case studies and direct surveys of Koike,
the latter two papers highlighted the apparently large increase in earnings
with tenure (seniority) in Japan compared to the United States.
Work by Ohtake (1998) and others using cross-sectional microdata has,
however, modiﬁed this view substantially. First, Ohtake ﬁnds that the re-
turn to tenure was smaller than had earlier been reported, even in the past.
Second, he shows that the returns to tenure fell between 1980 and 1992,
while rising in the United States. The cross-sectional data suggest that the
increase in earnings attributable to tenure is 1 percent to 2 percent per year
in Japan, still somewhat higher than in the United States. This is mainly,
but not entirely, due to the fact that seniority has a much larger eﬀect on
the earnings of Japanese blue-collar workers than their U.S. counterparts.
Although there may well be an explanation in terms of ﬁrm-speciﬁc hu-
man capital to support the high returns to tenure in Japan, there are other
views of this pattern that suggest that it may be a compensation policy de-
veloped in the 1920s and strengthened in the immediate postwar period to
motivate workers and to provide for basic needs. In this view, the returns to
seniority can be reduced through managerial reform without having any
adverse eﬀect on productivity, if pay-for-performance systems are intro-
duced. This seems to be what is taking place, albeit at a slow pace (Rebick
2001). If the returns to seniority were further reduced, this should naturally
raise the rate of mobility and also lessen the motivation of the courts to
maintain such high standards of legal protection. Some of the arguments
used by the courts have made reference to the need for worker protection
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corded to seniority (Chuma 1998).
The tenure eﬀect is so important for Japan because the average tenure is
higher in Japan than in most other OECD countries for all age categories,
Italy being a notable exception. As a result, middle-aged Japanese employ-
ees stand to lose more by leaving their ﬁrm than their counterparts in most
other countries. This is particularly important for the higher-paid employ-
ees of large Japanese ﬁrms who receive almost double the median tenure of
those in smaller ﬁrms (Ohtake 1998, table 4.7). The losses in earnings ex-
perienced by workers who leave ﬁrms after many years have an eﬀect on
mobility because they will increase resistance to the employer by unions or
workers who know they have the support of the legal system.
8.4.1 Age-Based Discrimination
A consequence of the long-term employment and seniority systems is
that Japanese ﬁrms impose age limits when recruiting and hiring. Workers
exceeding the age limit of the jobs posted continues to be the most common
reason for workers not changing jobs (Recruit 2001a, JIL 2001a). For this
reason, here we pay special attention to the overt age-based discrimination
in Japan’s labor market.
Over 90 percent of Japanese ﬁrms impose age restrictions, generally
thirty-ﬁve to forty, on their job openings. There is little variation across in-
dustry, ﬁrm size, and city size (JIL 2001b). There are many reasons why
ﬁrms impose age limits, but the primary concern is that older workers do
not ﬁt into the ﬁrm’s current employment system (table 8.2). These reasons
make sense in light of the previous discussion. Because of the prevailing
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Table 8.2 Reasons Firms Give for Age Restrictions in Recruitment
Percentage
Reason Giving Reason
Older workers lack physical endurance 33.8
Older workers require higher wages 26.9
Occupational skills do not match ﬁrm’s expectations 24.9
Desire to maintain a young workforce 23.8
To restrict number of job applicants 20.2
Older workers do not mix well with younger workers 14.9
Older workers are hard to handle 12.9
Older workers do not adapt well to corporate culture 9.9
To avoid exceeding the age structure of previous hires 8.8
Older workers lack motivation 6.7
Relative ease of hiring young workers 5.7
No posts for older workers and cannot accommodate them 4.8
Because other ﬁrms impose age limits 3.0
Source: JIL (2001b).norm of long-term employment, there is still a stigma attached to older or
mid-career job seekers and ﬁrms often view them as hard to handle or as
unable to adapt well to the corporate culture. It is also likely that many in-
dividuals who have lost jobs in other companies are simply not as capable,
so a potential employers’ view that they do not adapt well applied in their
former company. The hesitancy to hire mid-career workers is partly rooted
in the notion of equity. Indeed, from table 8.2 we can infer that the reason
for age restrictions is less because of the relative ease of hiring young work-
ers and more because “older workers do not mix well with younger work-
ers” to avoid exceeding the age structure of previous hires.
Under pressure for reform, guidelines to abolish age limits in recruiting
and hiring were introduced in October 2001 as part of the revised Employ-
ment Measures Law. However, the guidelines specify ten cases of exception
where limits are acceptable. One exception is phrased almost speciﬁcally to
prevent disruptions in the seniority system: “Cases where recruiting or hir-
ing is intended for workers under a certain age in situations where, in order
to make wage payments regardless of age to new employees, companies
will be required to revise present regulations determining wages mainly in
accordance with age” (JIL 2001a).
As it stands, the guidelines are viewed mainly as a cosmetic gesture; it
simply states that employers should make eﬀorts to abolish age limits. Un-
like some countries, the Japanese guidelines do not impose any penalty for
violations. A cursory glance at job postings after the guidelines went into
eﬀect conﬁrms that the vast majority continue to have age limits. (See, e.g.,
http://www.employment.yahoo.co.jp/.) It is thus questionable whether they
will have any eﬀective results in the foreseeable future. The example of
other countries’ experience suggests that the problem will not go away even
if the law is imposed with greater force. The high levels of tenure held by
Japanese workers, especially in large companies, mean that their losses of
both earnings and speciﬁc capital are likely to present them with even
greater problems than their counterparts elsewhere.
8.5 Firm-Size Diﬀerentials and Egalitarian Pay Norms
An important stylized fact about mobility in Japan is that employees
tend to move to smaller ﬁrms. In 1997 there were 1,670,000 employees who
switched ﬁrms, and, by deﬁnition, separations equaled accessions (MOL
1998, table 10). If we restrict attention to ﬁrms with more than 1,000 em-
ployees, there were 192,000 separations involving interﬁrm moves, but only
172,000 accessions. The main source of this mobility deﬁcit for large ﬁrms
is found in the ﬁfty and over age group. One reason for this distorted mo-
bility pattern may be found in the egalitarian pay norms (described in the
next section) and the presence of ﬁrm-size pay diﬀerentials.
Smaller ﬁrms pay substantially lower wages than larger ones, even after
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Ohta 1994; Rebick 1992). The reasons small ﬁrms pay less are not com-
pletely understood. Whatever they are, it is unlikely that the underlying
causes, many of which are rooted in Japan’s industrial organization, will
change over the short- or medium-term. As we explain in the next section,
the lower average pay levels found in smaller ﬁrms make them more likely
to hire older employees.
8.5.1 Maintaining Fairness
Baron (1988) emphasizes the role of peer groups and normative com-
parisons in shaping worker assessments of fairness and explains that
worker perceptions of fairness concerning output and rewards are gov-
erned more by social comparison when there is greater homogeneity
among workers. He explains that work force homogeneity “facilitates iden-
tiﬁcation with peers and co-workers, and that such homogeneity (is noted
to be) greater in Japanese than U.S. facilities” (Baron 1988, 516). Under a
system where wages and promotion are determined primarily by age and
seniority, careful measures are taken to ensure that workers are promoted
in accordance with seniority and that deviations from the main career
track are minimized. Promotion rates among Japanese establishments vary
across time, ﬁrm-size, industry sector, and sectoral output growth (Ariga,
Brunello, and Ohkusa 2000). However, comparisons between Japan and
the United States have consistently shown that the variance in wages
among Japanese organizations are smaller than their U.S. counterparts
(see, e.g., Ohta 2000 and Shirahase 2002).
Bringing older workers into the work force disrupts the seniority struc-
ture and hence the wage structure, because the employment system pre-
sumes entry from below. This is a reason why the introduction of pay-for-
performance systems that actually deliver high variance in outcomes has
been so slow. The preference for egalitarian pay in the presence of pay sys-
tems that have a strong age consciousness means that ﬁrms often feel that
it is necessary to pay mid-career hires as if they had similar seniority to
those of the same age in the ﬁrm. For example, a survey of 13,000 estab-
lishments (MOL 2000c) indicates that in the majority of ﬁrms surveyed,
new employees are in principlepaid approximately the same as existing em-
ployees of the same age and occupation. Only 15 percent indicated that
they would pay the new hires less than their age cohort, presumably be-
cause they lacked ﬁrm-speciﬁc experience. Since much of the value of older
employees may be ﬁrm speciﬁc, they are much less valuable after changing
ﬁrms. It is easier for smaller ﬁrms, with lower average pay levels to ﬁt these
employees into their pay structure in a way that does not violate the egali-
tarian norms of the ﬁrm. This is one of the reasons why we see a marked
tendency for older employees to move to smaller ﬁrms. Exceptionally able
or skilled employees may stay in the large ﬁrm sector or move up to larger
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archy.
We wish to emphasize that the combination of seniority- and age-related
pay, the preference for egalitarian pay for similar age groups, and the ﬁrm-
size diﬀerential distort the pattern of interﬁrm mobility in Japan. In par-
ticular, this means that the kinds of jobs available to older men in Japan will
be severely restricted, which in turn makes it more diﬃcult for larger ﬁrms
to dismiss their employees.
8.6 Female Labor Force Participation
This section provides an overview of women’s involvement in the Japan-
ese labor force. Following sections analyze the speciﬁc barriers that have
made that involvement less than it might be: exclusion from ﬁrms’ internal
labor markets and various aspects of the pension and beneﬁt systems. Ini-
tiatives to reconcile work and family life are also taken up.
Table 8.3 shows female labor force participation rates and the rates of
part-time work for women in Japan and elsewhere in OECD countries. Al-
though Japanese women do not have the lowest rate of overall participa-
tion, it is clear that they are far from having the highest. There is therefore
room for Japan to increase its labor inputs from this source. Furthermore,
Japanese women are more likely to work part-time (deﬁned as less than
thirty-ﬁve hours per week) than most of their counterparts elsewhere.
There are a number of reasons why these situations exist.
Women are more likely to exit the labor force for child rearing or other
family responsibilities and later return to the labor force. This exit and re-
entry results in the M-curve pattern of labor force participation rates. The
M-curve has ﬂattened since the early 1990s but as ﬁgure 8.1shows, the mass
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aPercentage of females ages 15–64 in the labor force.
bPart-time female workers as a percentage of all female workers. Part-time is deﬁned as less














































































































































































































.exit of women in their thirties continues to be a pronounced pattern in in-
ternational comparisons.
However, the proportion of women who want to work but cannot also is
highest among the thirties age group. When this proportion is included in
the actual participation rates, we obtain a curve that resembles Western
counterparts. This curve, known as the potential participation rate curve,
has received considerable attention in policy circles concerned with Japan-
ese women’s requirements for reconciling work and family life. The poten-
tial participation rates provide an upper bound of the number of women
who could be employed under conditions where various institutional bar-
riers have been removed. For example, Osawa (1998), citing results from
the 1992 National Survey on Lifestyle Preferences, reports that actual par-
ticipation will resemble potential participation if the proportion of women
who would work under conditions of reliable child care facilities are in-
cluded.
Another feature concerns the growth in part-time employment. As ﬁg-
ure 8.2 shows, the proportion of women in regular employment has
changed little since 1965. However, there has been a remarkable transition
from the informal sector (self-employed and family workers) to part-time
employment. This is attributable mainly to changes in industrial struc-
ture—a decline in agricultural employment and family-run work, a rise in
work opportunities in ﬁrms (Nagase 1997), and a relative improvement of
female wages (Shimada and Higuchi 1985).
Women’s working patterns are better understood by ﬁrst accounting for
their nonmarket activities. Although expectations and attitudes concern-
ing traditional gender division of labor are declining, Japanese women still
face pressure to remain full-time mothers for children under school age
and must maintain ﬂexible work patterns to accommodate their nonmar-
ket responsibilities. The Japanese government is attempting to change this
situation through measures such as the New Angel Plan, which includes
expansion of child care arrangements (MHLW 2001, 248–51).
Compounding these supply-side problems are demand-side impedi-
ments, such as the diﬃculty women face in being hired into the internal la-
bor market and disincentives stemming from the unintended consequences
in the tax and beneﬁt system.
8.7 Exclusion from Internal Labor Market
Both men and women face problems if they change ﬁrms or leave the la-
bor market for a time. Women are far more likely to temporarily leave the
labor force. Japanese ﬁrms, especially the more desirable employers, typi-
cally create an internal labor market. This involves extensive training
within the ﬁrm that presumes a long-term relationship between workers
and employers. Employers thus seek workers who plan to remain with the





























































































































































.ﬁrm over a long period, so that the costs of their investments will not be
lost. Because women are more likely to exit for reasons of marriage or child
rearing, they face statistical discrimination (Brinton 1989). High-status
positions in the seniority system are awarded to workers with long-
standing tenure, so few women reach the upper echelons. Moreover, al-
though Japanese women may enter large ﬁrms in equal proportions to
men, only a very small proportion of the women even enter career-track
positions. It is not that there has been a glass ceiling in Japan, it is that there
has not even been a ladder.
The common route for women is to re-enter the labor force as part-time
workers. Women who re-enter the market tend to ﬁnd employment in
smaller ﬁrms. In fact, Saso (1990) explains that older Japanese women are
much more concentrated than young women in small ﬁrms and unskilled
blue-collar occupations. Better educated married women with children are
more likely to remain nonparticipants, other things being equal. This may
be because the available jobs are not interesting or otherwise attractive to
such women, who may prefer to develop nonmarket (leisure) activities.
Using census data for Japan and the United States, Brinton and Ngo
(1993) estimate the index of gender segregation for the two countries in two
occupational categories—managers/administrators and unskilled blue-
collars. They ﬁnd that segregation is greater in Japan among managers/ad-
ministrators, and the segregation is greater among older age groups in
Japan, while it remains stable across all age groups in the United States.
Among unskilled blue-collar occupations, segregation is greater in the
United States, and while it decreases with age in Japan, it increases with age
in the United States.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the M-curve pattern of labor force
participation among Japanese women. The likelihood of their placement
into the internal labor market at the port of entry is lower than men’s, but
their attrition rate is even greater, as large numbers of women exit the labor
force for family duties. When they re-enter, they do so into unskilled occu-
pations. This pattern of labor mobility results in higher gender segregation
among management occupations and lower gender segregation among un-
skilled occupations for older workers.
8.8 Tax and Beneﬁt Systems
The structure of tax and beneﬁt schemes distorts the labor supply be-
havior of married women in part-time employment. For example, the sec-
ond earned income is treated in such a way that the after-tax income of
some households may actually decline if the second income exceeds the
limit (usually around ¥1 million per year). (Tax exempt status and pension
beneﬁts for spouses are not gender speciﬁc in Japan but we refer only to
women, as we are analyzing their impact on married women in general and
secondary wage earners in particular.)
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women from declines in household income when they moved from market
work to household work. However, because they rest on the implicit as-
sumption that married women should remain as full-time housewives, the
unintended consequences of such “policies to protect full-time house-
wives” (Higuchi 1995) have come under severe scrutiny amidst increasingly
diversifying patterns of women’s employment. There is strong evidence
that women in Japan adjust employment hours and annual income so as
not to exceed the critical exemption levels (Horioka 1999).
As a good basis for discussion, table 8.4 presents 1990 and 2001 surveys
that examine how employment patterns of married women in part-time po-
sitions are aﬀected by taxes and beneﬁts. An increasing number of respon-
dents—36 percent in 1990 and 49 percent in 2001—adjusted their em-
ployment level in response to these policies. Moreover, 70 percent of the
wives of salaried workers responded that they would increase their work
hours if these policies were removed. (National Survey on Lifestyle Prefer-
ences, as cited in Nagase 2001). Clearly, the proportion of women who
withhold labor as a consequence of such policies is not negligible.
The following discussion focuses on three factors—the tax exempt sta-
tus of spouses, social security programs, and fringe beneﬁts provided by
employers—and examines how they may constitute disincentives to mar-
ried women’s employment. A noteworthy pattern observed across the three
factors is that the adjustments in labor supply are more pronounced among
educated women (Abe and Ohtake 1997; Higuchi 1995). There are three
principal explanations for this. First, education is positively correlated
with wages, so highly educated women reach the critical level of earnings
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Table 8.4 Reasons Married Women in Part-Time Positions Gave for
Adjusting Income
Reason for adjusting annual income 1990a 2001b
Any reason 35.7 49.1
To avoid paying income taxc 30.0 27.8
To avoid exceeding tax exempt and special tax exempt 
status for spouses 23.5 32.6
To receive fringe beneﬁts from spouse’s employer 12.0 15.7
So health insurance and pension covered by spouse 11.5 30.5
So spouse’s employer will not ﬁnd out that I am working 0.8 1.4
To avoid paying unemployment insurance 2.0 7.5
Note: Multiple answers were allowed
aGeneral Survey on Part-time Workers Condition conducted by the MOL, as cited in Higuchi
(1995).
bRecruit Works Institute (2001a).
cThe General Surveyalso asked this question in two other forms: “I plan in advance so that my
annual income will not exceed ¥1 million” (which is the usual tax-exemption) was checked by
16.2 percent of respondents and “I adjust my work patterns throughout the year so that my
annual income will not exceed ¥1 million” by 13.8 percent.more quickly than less educated women. Second, highly educated women
have better knowledge of the lower and upper bounds of various exemp-
tions and respond more sensitively. Third, wives’ education is positively
correlated with husbands’ education (hence higher husbands’ earnings), so
they may have less incentive to work. Whatever the reasons, such an in-
centive structure depresses the rate of return to education for women, and
discourages the younger generation of women from pursuing higher edu-
cation.
8.8.1 Tax Code
The income tax code in Japan has undergone several revisions in the
postwar period. The 1950 revision introduced a system that placed the tax
burden on individual income instead of household income. However, be-
cause the per capita disposable income of a household declines as the num-
ber of dependents increases, the system also introduced exemptions for
part of spousal income. In the latest version, introduced in 1988, spouse’s
income was tax exempt up to ¥700,000 annually, after which for each
¥50,000 incremental increase in income, the exemption decreased ¥50,000,
so the exemption became zero at ¥1.4 million. This was an improvement
compared to its predecessor because it eliminates kinks or discontinuities
in (after-tax) household budgets. Still, even with the revisions, the marginal
tax rate for households is higher when the spouse’s income is between ¥1
million and ¥1.35 million, than when it is over ¥1.35 million.
Using the General Survey on Part-Time Workers Conditions, Abe and
Ohtake (1997) examine the labor force participation rates of married
women in part-time positions as a function of their annual earnings and
show that the distribution is concentrated around the ¥1 million mark,
with a signiﬁcant drop in participation for earnings over that. Nagase
(2001) shows similar results using monthly (not annual) income. Abe and
Ohtake furthermore show that the distribution of work-hours becomes a
bimodal distribution when adjusted for hourly wages, with spikes concen-
trated around the hours where the budget constraints are discontinuous.
An increase in wages implies that workers reach the ceiling more quickly,
so the consequence is that workers work less hours. In other words, there is
no incentive for married women to increase their supply of labor under the
current system.
There also is ample evidence that nonconvexities in the household bud-
get distort the labor supply of women. Higuchi (1995) and Osawa (1993)
present theoretical discussion of the impact of tax exemption schemes on
women’s labor supply before and after the revision of 1988.
8.8.2 Beneﬁts and Pensions
Features of the social security system have been criticized for causing
distortions in the labor supply of women. Under the current system, con-
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provided that employment hours do not exceed 75 percent of hours worked
by regular full-time workers and annual income does not exceed ¥1.3 mil-
lion. (The physically challenged and workers over sixty can earn ¥1.8 mil-
lion.) In addition, contributions to unemployment insurance are not re-
quired of a spouse with an annual income less than ¥900,000 who works
less than twenty hours per week. Hatta and Kimura (1993) argue that the
current pension system clearly favors households with full-time house-
wives, and that the removal of such “artiﬁcial barriers” to women’s em-
ployment will encourage more women to seek full-time employment. The
rise in regular employment will increase the base of pension payments and
subsequently alleviate the current imbalance between payments and re-
ceipts in the pension system.
The labor supply of married women is furthermore constrained by the
fringe beneﬁts provided by their husband’s companies. Abe and Ohtake
(1997) suggest this is the most important barrier to married women earn-
ing more than ¥1 million per year. Higuchi (1995) reports that over 80 per-
cent of Japanese companies provide fringe beneﬁts for employee depend-
ents (such as special beneﬁts for families and children) averaging ¥9,300
per month in 1992, but 60 percent of the companies will terminate beneﬁts
if spousal income exceeds a certain level, usually around ¥1 million. The
value of the beneﬁt may not be substantial sum, but it aﬀects the employ-
ment of 12 percent to 16 percent of married women (table 8.4).
8.9 Initiatives to Reconcile Work and Family Life
Under the Child Care Leave and Family Care Leave Law, child care
leave became mandatory for enterprises with more than thirty employees,
and family care leave became mandatory for all enterprises. Employees re-
ceive 25 percent of their wages while on leave. Despite this, a mere 0.6 per-
cent of male workers took child care leave following the birth of a child in
2002, and this ratio has remained unchanged since 1997 (MHLW as cited
in “Dansei no ikkyuu susumanu shocho” [No advances in child care leave
among men in the ministries], Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Tokyo], 18 Novem-
ber 2002). The vast majority who take leave are women. Some 70 percent
of women quit instead of taking maternity leave, citing reasons such as “it
was not the right climate at work” (from the 1996 National Survey on Fam-
ily Planning, cited in Breslin 1997, 292).
Companies that have re-employment schemes in which former employ-
ees are hired back receive subsidies to facilitate re-employment of women.
The system is beneﬁcial to both workers and employers insofar as it allows
recovery of previous investment in employer-speciﬁc skills (Imada 1998).
However, the proportion of companies that have the system stood at just
21 percent in 1996. Moreover, the system is subject to numerous terms and
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returnees as regular employees. In short, the current system does not oﬀer
particularly promising prospects for women who seek re-employment.
The presence of small children dramatically reduces Japanese women’s
labor supply (Hill 1989; Nagase 1997; Ogawa and Ermisch 1996), to a de-
gree beyond that witnessed in Western societies. For example, Tsuya,
Bumpass, and Choe (2000) show that the percentage of wives employed
among households with preschool age children is 37 percent in Japan and
58 percent in the United States. Studies have shown that maternity leave
policies and access to child care facilities increase women’s job continuity
(with the same employer) or re-entry into the labor force (Nakamura and
Ueda 1999). In particular, Higuchi, Abe, and Waldfogel (1997) show that
child care leave had a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on married-woman job
continuity in Japan, the United States, and United Kingdom, but the mar-
ginal eﬀect was found to be largest in Japan. Although the number of
women who take advantage of child care leave may be small, the authors
argue that their ﬁndings are encouraging. They conclude that what is re-
quired is not only for companies to install child care policies, but to ensure
an environment that allows workers to take advantage of such policies.
In response to growing worker demands, some Japanese companies have
introduced family-friendly policies or measures that help employees rec-
oncile the claims of work and family life (Sato 2000). Flexible working
schedules, subsidies for the costs of family care, and provision of child care
facilities in the workplace are common forms of these policies. The policies
are a private initiative, but the MHLW has set up a system of awards for
family-friendly ﬁrms to encourage their spread. The need for such policies
is a high-priority issue in light of the changing values among Japanese
workers. Survey results show that the proportion of men and women who
support the traditional gender division of labor is rapidly decreasing, while
the proportion of men and women who desire a balance between family
and work is increasing. (Consider, e.g., the 1999 Nippon Ho ¯so ¯ Kyo ¯kai
(NHK) survey cited in Sato 2000.)
However, the implementation of family-friendly policies in Japanese
ﬁrms remains limited. A MOL survey in 1997 (as cited in Sato 2000) found
that 51 percent of Japanese ﬁrms had no family-friendly policies apart
from the legal requirements. The survey also found great variation over
ﬁrm size and industry, with large ﬁrms not surprisingly doing the most.2
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2. The Ministry of Labor survey used a point scheme to tabulate the total number of points
out of 24 family-friendly schemes installed by the employer. Close to 100 percent of estab-
lishments greater than 500 employees had installed some form of family-friendly policy aver-
aging 11.7 points versus 44 percent and 3 points respectively among establishments with less
than 30 employees, and over 95 percent of ﬁrms in ﬁnance and insurance had installed fam-
ily-friendly policies averaging 7.8 points versus 40 percent and 1.5 points respectively in the
construction industry (from the 1996 Survey on Women Workers’ Employment Manage-
ment, Women’s Bureau, the Ministry of Labour, as cited in Sato 2000).A common way for Japanese families to reconcile work and family life is
to depend on extended family—that is, their children’s grandparents
(Morgan and Hirosima 1983). Empirical studies have found that coresi-
dence with grandparents greatly increases the probability of women’s en-
try into regular employment (Nagase 1997), and increases employment
hours (Tsuya, Bumpass, and Choe 2000). However, it should be noted that
the proportion of elderly in need of care is increasing, and the burden of
care will likely fall on women (Ogawa and Ermisch 1996; Osawa 1990).
Hence, reliance on grandparents to support women’s work lives cannot be
a long-term solution.
8.10 Quantifying the Barriers
Our approach to understanding the extent to which problems in the la-
bor market are aﬀecting economic growth is based on simple growth ac-
counting and looks at the medium term. We look for unutilized (or under-
utilized) labor assets and assume that they can be moved into production
evenly over a given period. This lets us know how much the potential
growth of the labor input could be altered if the impediments to the supply
of this labor were removed. The resulting ﬁgure can then be multiplied by
labor’s share of national output (roughly 70 percent in the Japanese case)
to yield a potential increase in output to the economy. This contribution is
a one-time increase but, for a ﬁxed period, represents an increase in the po-
tential growth rate. The calculation is necessarily crude and depends a lot
on the assumptions behind the estimates of the amount of labor that is not
being utilized. Still, this is a useful exercise to gain some idea of the scale of
the losses experienced by the economy from labor market supply problems.
We divide losses into four categories. One is excess labor being carried
by ﬁrms that are avoiding ﬁring workers. We include in this category the ex-
tent to which employers are unable to dismiss workers whose productivity
is low due to mismatch, although we do not treat them separately. The sec-
ond is losses from factors that may be increasing the extent of mismatch in
the economy and thereby raising the natural rate of unemployment. The
third relates to women working part-time and the fourth to women not
working at all.
8.10.1 Excess Labor
It is diﬃcult to know the extent to which ﬁrms are carrying excess labor.
The MHLW in its quarterly Ro ¯do ¯ Keizai Do ¯ko ¯ Cho ¯sa (Survey of Labor
Economy) reports the percentage of establishments surveyed that have sur-
plus workers, as well as the percentage with labor shortages, for diﬀerent
industries and occupations. These are useful for understanding cyclical
conditions and how they diﬀerentially aﬀect diﬀerent parts of the labor
market, but they give no real sense of the size of the problem.
Constraints on the Level and Eﬃcient Use of Labor 247Japanese ﬁrms carry some employees on their payrolls who are sent
home for spells, often on a rotating basis, during downturns. There are
government subsidies in some cases to encourage ﬁrms to do this rather
than dismiss the workers (Dore 1986). These individuals are addressed in
the Labor Force Survey under a special category (kyu ¯gyo ¯sha) that includes
all workers who are not at work on the survey day, including for illness or
absenteeism. Hashimoto (1993) notes that the number of kyu ¯gyo ¯shamoves
counter-cyclically and that adjustment in their number is generally less im-
portant than adjustment in hours and inventory as aspects of company re-
actions to the business cycle. The number of kyu ¯gyo ¯sha rose some 20 per-
cent from 1989 to 2000, nowhere near the doubling of the unemployed. The
increase represents some 200,000 employees, equal to 0.3 percent of total
employment. This is a reasonable lower bound for the number of surplus
workers in Japanese ﬁrms.
An approach for setting an upper bound is to look at ﬁgures for TFP
growth and argue that slower TFP growth is due to labor hoarding during
downturns. The 1990s were undoubtedly a period of slower TFP growth,
as was the mid-1970s following the ﬁrst oil shock. Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) calculate, after taking account of working hours, that TFP grew at
3.7 percent between 1983 and 1991 and then at only 0.5 percent between
1991 and 2000. They calculate that capital deepening increased during the
1990s from the 1980s, so it is unlikely that any drop in TFP growth could
be attributed to a drop in the rate of investment. If all of the drop is attrib-
uted to excess labor being held in ﬁrms, we see a loss of 3.2 percent in the
potential growth rate, assuming that this surplus labor could have been re-
employed productively elsewhere. This is unlikely, as it would imply that al-
most a quarter of the labor force was surplus to ﬁrms’ needs by the end of
the decade.
Still, if we assume that if ﬁrms were able to dismiss workers more easily,
the economy could reach the OECD average for TFP growth per annum
during 1979–1997 of 1.1 percent, then surplus labor kept in ﬁrms lowers
TFP growth by up to 0.6 percent per year. (In practice, the eﬀect would be
smaller because the reallocated labor would lose much of its job-speciﬁc
human capital.) This implies that the quantity of surplus labor currently is
around 5 percent of the employed, about the same as the number of unem-
ployed. This number often is quoted in press accounts, although it is un-
clear where reporters get their ﬁgures. We take it as the upper bound for the
number of redundant workers in Japanese ﬁrms.
8.10.2 Skill Mismatch
The problem of skill mismatch and the outward shift of the Beveridge
curve was discussed earlier. The 2000 Labor White Paper uses time series
of the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate to estimate that the natu-
ral rate of unemployment has risen from just over 2.0 percent to 3.5
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change, particularly the decline in manufacturing, although aging of the
work force is undoubtedly also part of the explanation. Using the result of
the MOL, we attribute a loss of 1.5 percent in overall labor input to the mis-
match problem in the labor market.
8.10.3 Female Labor Supply
We measure losses from barriers to the supply of women’s labor as being
losses from women working part-time and from women not participating
in the labor force at all. We use the United States as a benchmark to esti-
mate the extent to which labor market institutions reduce labor force par-
ticipation. If Japan raised the participation rate of women from its level of
67 percent to the U.S. level of 77 percent, there would be an increase of
about 15 percent in the female labor force input.
Japanese women put in around one hundred thirty-six hours per month,
which is 82 percent of the one hundred sixty-ﬁve hours averaged by men.
If employed Japanese women all worked as many hours as the men, they
would increase their labor input by 21 percent. This is grossly unrealistic
because some of these women are young and attending school; many
would prefer to stay home with small children, even if child care is avail-
able; and many have household duties, including caring for elderly rela-
tives, that take up much of their available time. However, it does serve as an
upper bound for the eﬀects of impediments that restrict hours of work. A
plausible lower bound for the eﬀect of disincentives to working full-time
comes from Higuchi (1995). He estimates that married women who delib-
erately constrain their hours because of the tax and beneﬁts system lower
the overall labor input of women by 1.4 percent.
For our estimate of the contribution of impediments that encourage
part-time work, we look at what would happen if the rate at which women
twenty-ﬁve to sixty-four in Japan worked part-time was at the U.S. level (20
percent) rather than its actual 42 percent. (Women younger than twenty-
ﬁve are excluded because many are still in school. Women over sixty-four
are more likely to wish to work part-time regardless of impediments to
working full-time.) Japanese women twenty-ﬁve to sixty-four work about
half as many hours as their full-time counterparts. If 50 percent of them
worked full-time, this would increase the female labor input by roughly 10
percent.3
Adding the two eﬀects (and compounding), gives a total increase in the
labor input of women of 26.5 percent. In terms of the overall labor force,
this is an increase of around 11 percent. This ﬁgure is slightly smaller if ad-
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3. Computed as the share of women working part-time multiplied by the share of hours of
full-time women worked by part-time women multiplied by the share of women switching
from part- to full-time work: 0.4   0.5   0.5   0.1.justed for quality. (Experience is an important component of quality and,
on average, female workers have less of it than male workers.)
8.10.4 Overall Implications for Economic Growth
Table 8.5 summarizes the calculations. The results are intended to give
some idea of how much of an impediment to economic growth the factors
mentioned might be. Output might be increased by between 9 percent and
12 percent. This is approximately equal to a 1 percent increase in the po-
tential growth rate of the economy over a ten-year period. This is, of
course, only a one-time beneﬁt that the Japanese economy could exploit,
but it is hardly a negligible one.
One question that naturally arises is why the impediments to the mobil-
ity of male employees that we examined have not been a problem in the
past. In fact, many of the institutions, including the strong protection of
regular employees and the personnel management system, have previously
been analyzed by many observers as great strengths (Koike 1988). Our ar-
gument is that these institutions have been successful under the strong de-
mand conditions that characterized the macroeconomy in Japan up to the
1990s, but they have not been successful under stagnant demand there-
after.
Aging of the work force also means that Japanese personnel practices
are in need of reform, but change has been slow so far (Ariga, Brunello, and
Ohkusa 2000). Under these conditions, institutions which were well suited
to a high-demand, moderate-to-rapid growth environment may become
problematic. This is one area where better theoretical understanding of in-
stitutions under diﬀerent growth environments is needed.
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Table 8.5 Eﬀect on Labor Input and Economic Output from Changes in the
Labor Market (%)
Factor Labor Input Economic Outputa
Reduce excess labor held by ﬁrms 0.3–5.0 0.2–3.5
Reduce skill mismatch 1.5 1.1
Increase women’s hoursb 4.1 2.9
Increase women’s participationb 6.2 4.3
Totalc 12.8–17.5 9.0–12.2
Note:As explained in the text these are one-time eﬀects that would be spread out over several
years.
aComputed as the increase in labor input (stub column) times labor’s share of output (70 per-
cent).
bComputed by multiplying the ﬁgures in the text by the proportion of women in the labor
force (41 percent).
cThe eﬀect of the two contributions concerned with women are compounded in calculating
the total.8.11 Role of Government Policy
Given that impediments to potential growth exist, how can government
policy address them? We are unable to quantify the extent to which gov-
ernment actions may be able to address the issues raised here, but we can
distinguish those areas where appropriate government policy should be
able to increase eﬀective labor inputs into the economy.
Table 8.6 provides a summary look at the role that government policy
could play. Many of these policies are already being introduced or are un-
der discussion in government deliberative councils. Looking at the mobil-
ity of male employees, it is clear that government legislation can change the
nature of employment protection given employees. If the costs of dismissal
can be reduced for employers, then this should release labor for more pro-
ductive use. As suggested by Ohtake (2001), revision of the laws governing
ﬁxed-term employment should make it easier for employers to hire work-
ers without making indeﬁnite commitments to them. Both of these actions
will undermine some of the loyalty of employees toward the ﬁrm, but this
must be weighed against the demoralization felt by many employees who
are not contributing much to the output of their ﬁrm.
There is probably not much that government policy can do to change the
nature of personnel management in the Japanese ﬁrm, although it can
continue to promote the development of deﬁned-contribution pension
schemes. In this area, government policy is moving in the right direction.
Barriers to midcareer hires are unlikely to be removed by government
action. The prohibition of age limits in job advertisements is unlikely to
have much eﬀect on age discrimination, at least in the short run. Subsidies
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Table 8.6 Government Policies to Reduce Labor Market Impediments to Growth
Labor market problem Government Policy Measures
Employment protection Legislation to reduce the cost of dismissals
Seniority pay structures and egalitarian pay  No measures
norms
Pension portability Encourage deﬁned-contribution plans
Information problems in the job market Further deregulation of the employment 
placement industry
Barriers to midcareer hires Lead by example in the public sector
Government tax and beneﬁt policies that discour- Abolish the exemption for dependent spouses 
age female labor supply and reform the beneﬁt system to encourage 
greater participation of women
Female career interruptions during childbearing  Encourage family-friendly workplaces with day 
years care provision and re-employment for women 
who take short career breaksto encourage midcareer employment have been tried in the past and are too
blunt a tool: They may well be taken up by ﬁrms that plan to hire middle-
aged and older workers anyway. The development of new career paths that
can be entered by middle-aged men and women is something that ﬁrms will
need to develop though their own action. The government may be able to
play a useful role, however, by leading through example in its own employ-
ment policies.
The government is working at improving information provision in the la-
bor market, but continued deregulation of the employment placement in-
dustry should help to change the environment. The government can play a
leading role in the development of a more open environment for informa-
tion through example, by making its own activities more transparent.
Much is already being done by the government to promote family-
friendly policies at ﬁrms and to develop day care provisions so that women
can remain at work. The government is contemplating major reform of the
income tax system that will abolish many of the features that discourage
women from participating or working longer hours (“Haigusha Kujowa
Shukusho ¯  mata wa Haishi wo Fukuda Kanbo ¯  Cho ¯kan” [General Secre-
tary Fukuda Says That the Tax Exemption for Spouses Should Be Reduced
or Abolished] Asahi Shimbun, 16 May 2002; available at http://www.asahi.
com/politics/reform/security/K200205160307071.html.
8.12 Conclusion
This chapter has examined a number of personnel practices, laws, and
regulations that lower the supply of labor in Japan. Broadly speaking,
there are two kinds of impediments: those that restrict the movement of
labor between ﬁrms and those that discourage women from participating
to a greater extent. There has been a symmetric lack of information be-
tween employers and job seekers, and this is almost certainly due to the
poor development of the external labor market in an economy with over-
all low mobility. It has been quite diﬃcult for a worker over thirty to ﬁnd
attractive job opportunities. This is especially true for women re-entering
the labor force. For married women, barriers also include disincentives in
the tax system and the dearth of meaningful work, especially for women
re-entering the labor force after rearing children. Despite changes, further
modiﬁcations in the legal structure and practices of Japan’s employment
system are necessary to facilitate the diversifying patterns of employment
and work attitudes of both men and women. Using other OECD coun-
tries and especially the United States as a benchmark, we estimate that re-
moval of these barriers would increase the productive labor supply in
Japan by 13 percent to 18 percent and thus could raise the potential
growth rate of the Japanese economy by roughly 1 percent a year over a
ten-year period.
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work is needed. First, we need to know more about the real extent of sur-
plus labor within ﬁrms. This requires more detailed surveys of individual
ﬁrms than have been carried out. Second, regarding midcareer hires and
their pay, research is needed beyond the qualitative studies done by the
government, especially concerning actual pay levels. Longitudinal data on
individuals are needed to see who manages to make a midcareer move suc-
cessfully. Third, further research in the area of labor market problems and
social norms would help us better understand why certain features, such as
egalitarian pay norms and ﬁrm-size diﬀerentials, are more persistent than
others.
A better theoretical understanding of the way in which institutions that
function well during periods of normal or rapid growth may become lia-
bilities when growth is stagnant is especially important. The role of the
family and of state policy and their eﬀect on female labor supply during pe-
riods of rapid social change needs to be better understood. This could be
usefully looked at in an international comparative perspective, especially
southern European countries where women also have had less of a role in
the labor market in the past but are now increasing participation.
Although changes to overcome some of the barriers, such as the poor
provision of information in the labor market, are being promoted by gov-
ernment and business leaders, many other changes require broader trans-
formation of the Japanese economy. As Noguchi (1995) has pointed out,
Japanese economic policy is still based to a large extent on the premise that
much of the security and welfare of individuals in the economy will be pro-
vided through their employers. Japanese labor law (as developed through
case law), industrial policy, and ﬁnancial regulation have been based on
this assumption.
Policy makers and regulators in areas other than labor will need to
change their approach for the full beneﬁts of any change in labor regula-
tions to be realized. The large-scale restructuring that is required if Japan
is to continue to shift away from manufacturing and reduce the size of its
construction industry also requires a shift toward increasing provision of
security through private or state-provided insurance. This in turn may have
the eﬀect of introducing a diﬀerent set of ineﬃciencies, including an in-
creased rate of unemployment and earlier retirement. Policies will need to
be designed carefully if this kind of outcome is to be avoided.
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